

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01089 01 OF 02 100931 Z

12

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

----- 023096

R 100645 Z MAY 73

FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7364

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION USUN

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 1089

EXDIS

E. O. GDS

TAGS: PFOR CY GR TU

SUBJECT: CYPRUS DEVELOPMENTS AND SUGGESTED USG LINE

REF: STATE 74117, NICOSIA 970, TEL AVIV 3239, ANKARA 3428

SUMMARY: REF DEPTTEL ASKED EMBASSIES' VIEWS AT TO WHAT USG SHOULD BE DOING IN PRESENT STATE OF CYPRUS PROBLEM. WE BELIEVE QUESTION MADE EVEN MORE TIMELY BY POSSIBILITY OF GRIVAS INVOLVEMENT IN MAKARAIO CONTROVERSY WITH THREE BISHOPS, AND BY RECENT INCREASE IN TURKISH/ GREEK TENSIONS OVER THRACE AND MINORITY PROBLEMS. THOSE TENSIONS WILL ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO OBSTACLES IN WAY OF INTERCOMMUNAL SOLUTION AND MAY CONTRIBUTE TO INSTABILITY IN CYPRUS. WE BELIEVE TIME IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR FORMAL USG DEMARCHES, BUT WE PROPOSE TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS TO PERSUADE THEM OF POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO THEIR INTERESTS AND OURS LATENT IN DEADLOCK WHICH SEEMS TO BE EMERGING. END SUMMARY.

1. WE ALL REGULARLY CONSIDER IMPACT OF CYPRUS PROBLEM ON BROADER GREEK- TURKISH RELATIONS. IT MAY NOW BE APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER THE REVERSE SITUATION.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01089 01 OF 02 100931 Z

2. TURKISH EMBASSY HERE TAKES LINE THAT TURKEY HAS TRIED TO KEEP CYPRUS AND OTHER GREEK- TURKISH ISSUES APART, TO FACILITATE PROGRESS ON FORMER. NOW, HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO TURKS, GREECE REFUSES TO TAKE UNAMBIGUOUS LINE WITH GRIVAS TO PROMOTE SUCCESS OF TALKS, AND TURKEY CAN NO LONGER WAIT UNTIL TIME FORCES GREECE TO MORE COOPERATIVE STAND BEFORE TURKEY SURFACES OTHER QUESTIONS.

3. PROBLEM WITH THIS APPROACH AS WE SEE IT IS THAT, IF TURKEY WANTS PAPADOPOULOS TO TAKE HELPFUL POSITION ON CYPRUS, IT SHOULD HAVE AN INTEREST IN CREATING CONDITIONS WHICH MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO DO SO. IF RELATIONS WITH TURKEY ARE GENERALLY ON COURSE, DOMESTIC POLITICAL COSTS TO HIM OF TAKING SUCH A LINE ARE REDUCED. HE CAN REBUT CRITICS WITH ARGUMENT THAT ANKARA RELATIONSHIP IS KEY TO GREEK SAFETY, AND THAT ACCOMMODATION ON CYPRUS IS NECESSARY TO PURSUE BROADER BENEFITS. ON OTHER HAND, WHEN GREEK- TURKISH RELATIONS ARE SOURED BY OTHER ISSUES, WE IMAGINE HE WOULD HAVE MORE DIFFICULT TIME ARGUING THAT RELATIONS WOULD BE GOOD IF ONLY CYPRUS ISSUE RESOLVED OR AMELIORATED.

4. WE DEFER TO ATHENS AS TO WHETHER STATEMENT OF PAPADOPOULOS PROBLEM PARA 3 IS CORRECT. IF IT IS, WE BELIEVE IT PROVIDES NUCLEUS OF A LINE WE SHOULD TAKE WITH ANKARA. (WE HAVE TRIED IT INFORMALLY HERE, FIND THAT IT TENDS TO NONPLUS TURK EMBOFFS, BUT THAT THEY RETURN DOGGEDLY TO LINE PARA 2.)

5. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT CYPRUS SITUATION IS EITHER AT A CRISIS POINT OR BALANCED AT THE EDGE OF RESOLUTION. FORMAL USG APPROACHES AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO HAVE A DRAMATIC EFFECT, AND TO UNDERTAKE THEM WOULD BE TO WASTE OUR SHOTS. WE DO THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IN INFORMAL APPROACHES WE CAN UNDERLINE THE BENEFITS OF MODERATING, IN TERMS OF GREEK AND TURKISH INTERESTS AS WELL AS GENERAL NATO INTEREST, IN A MANNER MORE FORCEFUL THAN IS POSSIBLE FROM LOWER LEVELS WITHIN GREEK AND TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRIES (WE SUSPECT WORKING LEVEL EMBOFFS HERE SEE DANGERS.)

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 01089 01 OF 02 100931 Z

6. IN TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP, INTRANSIGENCE FEEDS INTRANSIGENCE. GRIVASIST THREAT CAUSES MAKARIOS TO (A) PROCLAIM HIS OWN QUALIFICATIONS AS ENOSIST, WHICH MULTIPLIES TURKISH SUSPICIONS BOTH OF HIM AND OF " GREEK ENOSIST PLOT" , WHILE (B) HE RELIES IN SOME PART ON LYSSARIDES FOR ARMED COUNTER TO GRIVASIST GANGS, WHICH INCREASES GOG AND TURKISH SUSPICIONS AS TO HIS POLITICAL ORIENTATION.

7. RELAXING THE TENSION WOULD ALSO PRODUCE CHAIN REACTION, BUT A FAVORABLE ONE. WE SEE USG PRESENT ROLE AS REMINDING ALL THREE OF THIS REALITY, AND PERHAPS THEREBY FORESTALLING A SITUATION WHICH COULD SOME DAY THREATEN OUR INTERESTS QUITE DIRECTLY AND DEMAND MORE DRAMATIC AND COSTLY US INTERVENTION. WE THINK THAT IMPARTIAL APPROACH IS POSSIBLE BY POINTING OUT TO ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS THE NATURAL CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR PRESENT COURSES. SUGGEST THIS MIGHT BE DONE INFORMALLY WITH APPROPRIATE PERSONS IN ALL THREE CAPITALS AND IN WASHINGTON.
POPPER

SECRET
NMAFVVZCZ

ADP000
SECRET

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01089 02 OF 02 100900 Z

11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
----- 022817

R 100645 Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7365
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 NICOSIA 1089

EXDIS

8. TO TURKEY, WE WOULD RECOMMEND TAKING THE LINE IN PARA 3 ABOVE, REMINDING THEM ALSO THAT IT IS TURKS RATHER THAN GREEKS WHO SEEM RESPONSIBLE FOR CURRENT DELAYS IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.

9. TO GREECE, WE RECOMMEND ARGUMENTS NICOSIA 970: (A) GRIVAS VIOLENCE IS WEAKENING THOSE MODERATES (INCLUDING CLERIDES) WHO CAN DELIVER AN ACCOMMODATION WITH TURKEY, AND GRIVASIST ATTACKS ARE FORCING GREEK CYPRIOT LEADERS INTO INCREASINGLY STRONG ENOSIST STATEMENTS, WHICH IN TURN MULTIPLY TURKISH SUSPICIONS OF BOTH NICOSIA AND ATHENS. (B) LOW- GRADE INSURRECTION REVIVES DANGERS THAT SOMEBODY WILL KILL TURKS, BRING ABOUT ANAKRA INVOLVEMENT AND THREATEN BOTH GREEK SECURITY AND SOUTHERN FLANK OF NATO. (C) SO LONG AS THREAT

OF GRIVASIST VIOLENCE EXISTS, THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE TURKS
WILL MOVE TO INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT. (D) INsofar AS
GRIVAS SUCCEEDS, HE THREATENS TO PRESENT GOG WITH NIGHTMARE
IT WOULD MOST WISH TO AVOID: INTERNECINE CIVIL STRIFE
AMONG GREEK CYPRIOTS, WITH GRIVASISTS CALLING ON ATHENS TO
TAKE OVER CYPRUS IN NAME OF HELLENISM, AND ANTI- GRIVASISTS
AND OTHERS CALLING ON UN, GUARANTOR POWERS INCLUDING TURKEY,
US , AND EVEN USSR, TO PREVENT IT. (E) BEST WAY TO COUNTER
COMMUNIST AND LYSSARIDES INFLUENCE IN CYPRUS IS TO BRING

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01089 02 OF 02 100900 Z

GRIVAS UNDER CONTROL SO THAT ARCHBISHOP IS NOT FORCED TO
RELY ON LEFT AS HIS ONLY ORGANIZED BUTTRESS AGAINST GRIVAS.
WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR OUR ASSUMPTION, THROUGH ALL THESE POINTS,
THAT GOG IS NOT POWERLESS TO CONTROL GRIVAS OR DISASSOCIATE
FROM HIM.

10. FINALLY, WE WOULD COMPLEMENT ALL THIS IN NICOSIA BY
URGING CYPRUS GOVT TO MEET GREEK CONCERNS THROUGH ACTION TO
DISSOCIATE ARCHBISHOP FROM MAVERICK LEFTIST DR. VASSOS
LYSSARIDES AND THROUGH GREATER GOC EMPHASIS ON NON- COMMUNIST
CHARACTER OF CYPRUS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE.

11. WE BELIEVE THAT GOG IS IN FACT BEING SOMEWHAT MORE
FORTHCOMING THAN HERETOFORE IN TRYING TO KEEP GRIVAS FROM
PURSUING VIOLENCE, BUT WE ALSO ASSUME THAT PRESENT CONTRO-

VERSY BETWEEN MAKARIOS AND THE THREE BISHOPS HAS GATHERED
STEAM WITH GRIVAS SUPPORT AND MAY PRECIPITATE
GRIVASIST VIOLENCE WHEN STEPS ARE TAKEN TO FILL PAPHOS
BISHOPRIC POST AND TO TRY THE THREE CYPRUS BISHOPS.
THIS IN TURN WILL CONFRONT ATHENS WITH A DIFFICULT
DECISION. THERE IS THUS A PARTICULAR URGENCY IN ANY
USG EFFORT TO WARN ALL PARTIES CONCERNED OF RISKS
ENTAILED IN ALLOWING MATTERS TO RUN THEIR PRESENT COURSE,
ON AND OFF THE ISLAND.

POPPER

SECRET

NMAFVVZCZ

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS

*** Current Classification *** SECRET

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PFOR CY GR TU
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 10 MAY 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973NICOSI01089
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NICOSIA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730541/aaaaittn.tel
Line Count: 211
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 73 STATE 74117, 73 NICOSIA 970, 73 TEL AVIV 3239, 73 ANKARA 3428
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03-Aug-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <18-Sep-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> mcm 980127
Subject: CYPRUS DEVELOPMENTS AND SUGGESTED USG LINE
TAGS: PFOR, n/a
To: ANKARA
ATHENS
LONDON
NATO
SECSTATE WASHDC
SS
USUN

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005